We have developed a simple approach to valuing risky corporate debt when corporations own securities issued by other corporations. We assume that corporate debt can be valued as an option on corporate business asset value, and derive payoff functions when there exist cross-holdings of stock or debt between two firms. Next we show that payoff functions with multiple cross-holdings can be solved by the contraction principle. The payoff functions which we derive provide a number of insights about the risk structure of company cross-holdings. First, the Modigliani-Miller theorem can obtain when there exist cross-holdings between firms. Second, by establishing cross-shareholdings each of stock holders distributes a part of its payoff values to the bond holder of the other's firm, so that both firms can decrease credit risks by cross-shareholdings. In the numerical examples, we show that the correlation in firms can be a critical condition for reducing credit risk by cross-holdings of stock using Monte Carlo simulation. Moreover, we show we can calculate the default spread easily when complicated cross-holdings exist in many firms by a simulation that includes the contraction principle method. By using our method, we can reevaluate which cross-held shares are beneficial or disadvantageous for the cross-holding firms.
Introduction
The cross-holding of stock among companies (also called cross-shareholding and reciprocal ownership of shares) is a common practice in Japan, Korea and Europe. Its economic significance in post-war Japan is apparent from the vast cross-shareholding patterns that reflect the structure of the pre-war zaibatsu, and from the implications for corporate finance, which has heavily depended on bank financing. Yonezawa [17] proposes four hypothesis about the role of cross-holding as follows: (1) protection from takeover, (2) benefits of cooperation, (3) reduction of agency cost, (4) reduction of default risk.
In the early 1990s, various papers focused on the effect of cross-holding on stock markets, particularly since the market capitalization of the Tokyo Stock Exchange at that time was the highest in the world. Bierman and Noyes [l] point out that merely aggregating each company's market value to evaluate market capitalization is misleading because crossholdings cause double counting. Ikeda(91 shows why Japanese firms have had considerably higher price/earning ratios than U.S. firms. Numerous other articles focused on the effect of cross-holding on the stock market, including Bierman and Noyes [2] , Brioschi, Buzzacchi and Massimo [4] , Feguson and Hitzig [6] , McDonald[13] and Sinha [16] . There are also many Japanese papers on cross-holding written in the 1980s and early 1990s that examine the effect of cross-holding on corporate governance and the stock market.
In the late 1990s, many Japanese companies began unwinding their cross-shareholdings at market value amid growing difficulties in the harsh business environment and poor performance of their shareholdings. As a result, public interest in cross-shareholding resurged in Japan. For the same reasons, the valuation of corporate debt became an important concern among institutional investors. We thus need to develop a method for valuing corporate debt when stock cross-holdings exist. Few studies on this problem are found in the literature. The valuation of corporate debt incorporating the effect of capital structures is investigated by Merton [14] , Black and Cox [3] , Geske [7] , Longstaff and Schwartz [12] Briys and Varenne [5] , and Kijima and Suzuki [10] .
However, they do not consider cross-holding because it does not exist in the U S .
From the preceding two facts -that most Japanese papers on cross-holding focus on the stock market, and that cross-holding does not exist in U.S. -it is clear that the effect of cross-holding on the corporate debt market has not been sufficiently investigated.
This paper develops a simple new approach to valuing corporate debt that considers cross-holding by extending the Merton model in two steps. First, we define cross-holding in the context of the corporate capital structure. Second, we show the payoff functions of corporate securities when cross-holdings exist among two firms. When there exist complicated cross-holdings among N > 3 firms, we cannot obtain payoff functions by closed-form expressions as in the two-firm case. But we can solve this problem by the contraction method.
In Japanese seminal papers, Kurasawa [ll] discusses the rationality of cross-holdings, and Yonezawa [17] investigates the role of cross-holding in Japanese society. Their model describes cross-holdings by using corporate cash flows and considering how firms can be in default. Our approach is distinct from their model in that we use balance sheets to model cross-holdings. By using balance sheets, we can use an option approach model that is widely developed in the literature. In addition, by using the payoff functions that we derive, we provide a number of insights on the effect of cross-holdings on corporate debt.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses corporate capital structures with respect to cross-holdings, and defines cross-holdings of stock and cross-holdings of debt. Section 3 derives a payoff function for corporate securities that incorporates both cross-holdings of stock and cross-holdings of debt. Section 4 shows that the Modigliani-Miller theorem obtains when there exist cross-shareholdings between firms. Section 5 presents the results of the theoretical analysis by using simple examples. Section 6 shows numerical examples t hat provide insights into the unwinding of cross-holdings. Section 7 summarizes our findings and makes concluding remarks.
Corporate Capital Structure
To provide a corporate capital structure when firms own stocks and bonds of other firms, we make the following assumptions. 5 There exist at least one j such that Assumption 1 provides the same liability structure supposed by Merton [14] . From Assumptions 4 and 5, it follows that there must be at least one firm which has stockholders or bondholders outside of the N firms. Stated differently, there can exist a firm that all stockholders and all debt holders are among the N firms. ( 2 ) and (3) can be rewritten as Merton [14] supposes that the firm asset value is the exogeneous variable. 
This is a system of equations which have max and rnin where Fl(T), f i ( T ) , S l ( T ) , S2(T)
are unknown; Vk(T)(k = 1 , -, M ) , Bl, B2 are known. Next, noting that V k ( T ) = Vk, Si(T) = S;, F,(T) = F,
N firms case
It is difficult to extend Proposition 1 to an N firms case because with N firms, we need 2N areas to clarify the payoff functions. We next show that payoff functions in the case of N firms are given by a simulation with the following notation. 
It is clear that equation (5) is a fixed point problem for Z(T). Now, we will show that it can be solved by the contraction principle.
non-negative real number space. Suppose there exist N firms which satisfy Assumptions 1 through 5. Then using function g which is defined by equation ( 5 ) , (6) , payoff functions Z ( T ) can be given as where
Proof: See Appendix.
This proposition shows that we can obtain payoff values by simulation when crossholdings exist among firms. Moreover, if N firms have at least one investor outside the N firms (Assumption 5), the payoff value can converge (See Proof). In the case of Japanese mochiai, the convergence is certain because banks, who play a central role in the mochiai structure, have many outside investors in the form of depositors. The next result can be derived from the fact that in Proposition 1, we could specify the payoff functions of securities issued by cross-holding firms.
Modigliani-Miller Theorem with Cross-Holdings

Proposition 3 Suppose that two firms establish cross-shareholdings b y issuing new stocks and immediately buying each other3 stock. Then) the value of each firm's business assets is invariant to the estab1is~men.t of cross-holdings of stock.
Remark 4.1 In this cross-shareholding, both firms expand their firm size with no cash. However, the cross-holding does not change the value of either firm's business assets. Hence, in a market that allows cross-shareholding, there exist many stocks that are not collateralized by real business assets. From the equations (7) and (81, for given coupons el, c2, the dividend of each cross-holding firm must be given by Second? we show that there exist self-financing trading strategies that finance the crossholding firm's debts and stocks.
From Proposition 1, we specify the payoff functions of the cross-holding firm's debts and stocks. Hereafter7 let these functions be rewritten as follows:
Because of the assumption of complete markets) we can obtain self-financing trading strategies with terminal values Fl (V:(T)) V ; (T), T) and F2 (K (T), K (T), T) using the plain firm's business assets. Now let cl < C:) c2 < Ci. Then the strategies can consume cl, c2 per unit time respectively.
For the same reason, we can obtain self-financing trading strategies with terminal values Sl(V:(T), V;(T)) 2") and S2(V:(T), V;(T), T). Here) it can be shown that the self-financing trading strategies consume dividends dl, d2) which are the same dividends as the stocks issued by the cross-holding firms. This is because from equation (71, the residual cash of business assets Vc and Vg is shown to be
Moreover, the exposures of the strategies are shown to be by the definition of payoff functions in Proposition 1. Hence) the strategies can consume cash that is equal to equation (9) . Thus, by following the four self-financing strategies, a firm can receive interim payments exactly equal to those on the debt and stock of the cross-holding firms.
Third) we can show that the four self-financing strategies and cross-holding firms) debt and stock are the same value respectively at time t as follows:
This occurs due to the existence of risk neutral measure Q, and to the fact that Vl(T) = v ( T ) ) V2(T) = q ( T ) must be satisfied from the assumption of identical investment policy.
Finally) from the definition of each payoff function and the existence of risk neutral measure Q) we obtain the following equation Moreover) from the definition of cross-holding firm) we can obtain Thus from equations (1 1)) (10) and (12), we have G ( t ) = K ( t ) . From this it follows that Proposition 3 holds, because we can show V2(t) = Y ( t ) in the same way. This is explained as follows. The holding ratio of the original stockholder who owns firm 1's stock is changed from 1 to 1 -s 2 1 . Thus with cross-shareholding) the change in dividend to the original stockholder of firm 1 is equal to (1 -s21)d1 -dz. In the same way, the change in dividend to the original stockholder of firm 2 is equal to (1 -s12)d2 -d;. Here) we can use equations (7) and (8) Hence) holding an equal amount of stock in cross-holdings is disadvantageous for the stockholder who originally owned stock paying the higher dividend.
Effect of Cross-Holdings
The payoff function presented in this article has many implications for the risk structure of companies with cross-holdings. In this section) we show some of the implications .through several examples. It should be noted that the following implications are not dependent on the stochastic process of underlying business asset value.
In example A) we indicate by S t ( i ) and KA(t) the equity value and debt value issued by firm z. In examples B and C ) we indicate securities value in the same way.
Effect of stock cross-holdings
Below we examine the effect of firm cross-holdings of stock.
Suppose once again we have the plain firms and cross-holding firms in the proof of Proposition 3. Each firm's capital structures is shown in the Example A and Example B which follow. Suppose further that the plain firms change their capital structures and become cross-holding firms by issuing new stock and immediately buying the other's stock. Moreover, we suppose the same assumption as in section 3: (1) complete market) (2) the plain firm and cross-holding firm have identical businesses. Hence, from Proposition 3, the business asset values of both firms are not affected by the establishment of stock crossholdings.
Example A (plain firms)
firm 1 firm 2
The debt of both firms) as investigated by Merton, have the following payoff functions: Figure 2 shows the areas that determine whether each firm is solvent or in default. 
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Valuing Corporate Debt Figure 3 shows the areas that determine whether each firm is solvent or in default.
(Ass) Both firms are solvent; (Ads) Firm 1 is in default, firm 2 is solvent; (Asd) Firm 1 is solvent, firm 2 is in default; (Add) Both firms are in default. in the value at time t means the decrease of credit risk. Hence, cross-shareholding between firm 1 and firm 2 will reduce the credit risks of each firm.
Second, we should remark that the correlation between business assets value can be important measure of credit reducing effect by cross-holdings of stock. Because, when the correlation is lower, there exists higher probability that (Vl,V2) falls into areas Ai(As) or A^(&) which are beneficial to firm 1's (firm 2's) bond holder. We will examine it by numerical example in Section 6.2.
Last, from the equations (1 7) through (20), we can find that and AFl + ASl = -AS2 > 0, AFl > 0, AS1 > 0, (K, U) â As.
(22) Hence, firm 1's credit risk reduction is caused by cash distribution from the firm 2's stock holder. In these areas (Al, A2), firm 2's business is successful while firm 1's business is failed. So, in these areas, there exist cash distribution from successful business firm's stock holder to failed business firm's bond holder. In the same way, we can find the same result with respect to firm 2's credit risk reduction by using the areas Ah A;. Finally, we can find that cross share-holdings decrease both firms' credit risks and the credit risk reduction is caused by the partial loss of the other firm's stock holder. It should be noted that stock holders distribute cash to the other firm's bondholder when their own business is successful while the other firm's business is failed. Example 5.1 In this paper, we regard stocks as options on business assets. However, as a practical problem in stock investment, investors usually use a mean-variance approach without regarding stocks as options. One simple and practical idea for a mean-variance approach that considers cross-shareholding is as follows.
Let the two plain firms' stocks in Example A be characterized by expected rates of return pl, p.t and expected variances ff2 02. Let both firms be solvent. Then when crossshareholding is established, the firm's stock (firm 1 in Example B) is characterized by pl and 02 as follows where p is the correlation of each firm's business assets. This is because the dependent variable of firm 1's stock is changed from Vl to V\((l -s~~s~~) + sl2&/(l -s~~s~~) as shown in equation (14), and because the stockholding ratio is reduced from 1 to 1 -5 2 1 by crossholding. We must note that this simple approach cannot be applied to a mean-variance approach for debt because it does not consider the firm's default.
Effect of debt cross-holdings
In the following example, we assume that the firm value is not changed by the establishment of the cross-holding of debt.2 We will examine the effect of cross-holdings of debt on the firm debt value using the following example:
Example C (cross-holdings of debt)
This can be easily proved by the analogy of Proposition 3.
In this example, cross-holdings of debt exist between firm 1 and firm 2, and each firm owns a business asset. Hence, payoff functions Fi{T) and F2(T) are given by Proposition 1 under the following conditions:
We omit the payoff functions and show only the areas which determine the state of each firm is as follows: Figure 2 and 5 , we can see that the intersection point of the four lines denoted by (B1,B2) moves to (Bh B',). This is not the ordinary offsetting effect of cross-holdings of debt on the face value of each other's debt. We emphasize that both lines intersecting at (Bi, B;) have negative slope. Hence the area Add is not rectangular. These facts are important because if we move from (Bl, B2) to (B1, B',) by valuing debt in the conventional method of offsetting face value -thus ignoring cross-holdings of debt -we obtain the payoff functions:
From these equations, the area in which both firms are in default is given by This is a rectangular area and smaller than the corresponding area Add in Example C ( Figure   5 ). Therefore, offsetting the face values of debt and ignoring cross-holdings of debt lead to overvaluing each firm's debt.
Numerical Examples
In the following numerical examples, we assume that there are no coupon payments and dividends for the purpose of simplicity.
Valuation method
We assume that the stochastic processes of underlying business assets Vk(t) under risk neutral measure Q are given as where r is a constant risk free rate, a-k are constants, and wk(t) are standard Wiener Processes. The instantaneous correlation between dwi(t) and dwj(t) (i # j) is pijdtThe no arbitrage assumption in financial economics implies that the price of any derivative security must equal the discounted value of its payoff function integrated against the appropriate state-price density. Hence the no arbitrage price, where the payoff function is defined by either Proposition 1 or 2, is where dQ (a) is the state-price density.
In our model, it is efficient to use a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain no arbitrage price because business assets are log-normally distributed and the securities are high dimensional multivariate basket type options. If two firms are related through cross-holdings of stock or cross-holdings of debt, then the payoff function is clearly given by Proposition 1, and we can obtain the no-arbitrage price by simple simulation. If N(> 2) firms are related through cross-holdings of stock or debt, then the payoff function is given by Proposition 2. In this case, we can obtain the price as follows:
Step 1 Generate a sample path of V(T). It is denoted by ~' ( 2 ' ) ;
Step 2 Take Zo(T) E fifoYool, for instance Zo(T) = (0, -'0)'. Simulate lie=, gn(Zo(T), V1(T)). Then obtain the payoff value, z l (~) (~r o p o s i t i o n 2); Step 3 Calculate the discounted value of ~( 2 ' ) . It is denoted by ~( t ) ; 6.2. Two firms case As mentioned in Section 5.1, we now show the effect of the correlation in change in business assets value of cross-holding firms. Moreover, in this section we examine the effect of unwinding cross-shareholdings. To examine the effect of establishing and unwinding cross-holdings, we will calculate the default spread that is defined by the equation First, suppose there are plain firms (Example A) and cross-holding firms (Example B).
Here we present two cases (p12 = p = 0.9, -0.9) for Example B. By using symmetrical balance sheets for the two firms, we need to consider only firm l's default spread. Figure 6 shows default spreads obtained with a Monte Carlo simulation that includes payoff functions determined by Proposition l. From Figure 6 , we can see that the credit risk barely decreases when p is high. Hence, the correlation in two firms' business asset can be a critical condition for reducing credit risk by cross-holdings of stock.
Second, suppose cross-holding firms sell their cross-held stock in the market? and then buy their business assets to expand their business. Then the new asset values, denoted as &'(t), Kt (t) respectively, satisfy the equations Hence, the balance sheets are given as follows:
Example D (unwinding of cross-shareholdings)
This is the usual case when cross-shareholdings are unwound. Here, we calculated the default spread when p is equal to -0.9. This is shown in Figure 6 . From the figure, we can see that the credit risk increases. Moreover, we calculated the default spread when p is equal to 0.9. In this case, the default spread decreases when cross-shareholdings are unwound (figure omitted for brevity). Hence, we find that unwinding cross-shareholdings between relatively uncorrelated firms tends to increase their credit risks, while doing so between highly correlated firms tends to reduce their credit risks.
Here, we recall that firm size in Example D is equal to Example B. Moreover, Example D is also a case of a simple capital increase wherein plain firms (Example A) increase their capital by issuing new stock. By comparing the effect of shifting from Example A to Example B on the one hand? and from Example A to Example D on the other, our previous finding can be interpreted as follows: the credit risk reduction by establishing cross-shareholding between relatively uncorrelated firms (Example B, p = -0.9) is greater than in the case of a simple capital increase (Example D). As shown in section 6.1, Step 1 and Step 2 are based on Proposition 2. So, we show t h e convergence of Z ( T ) with two prescribed steps.
Step 1: For instance, we set V~T ) as follows:
Step 2: Then we obtain the value Zn(T) as follows:
In this example, we can approximate the value of Z ( T ) as Z20. Remember that when there are four firms with no cross-holdings, we need to calculate eight payoffs functions by max or min operator respectively as seen in equation (13). Thus even when crossholdings exist) the determination of payoffs by convergence as shown above is not excessively burdensome for valuing securities.
Incidentally, the sample business asset values V2(T), V3(T) and V4(T) are smaller than the bond face values B2) B3 and B4. Hence when the firms do not establish cross-holdings) firms 2,3 and 4 are in default. Therefore, firms 2 ) s and 4 benefit from the high value of firm 1's business asset Vl(T) by cross-holding.
Conclusion
This article develops a new framework for valuing corporate debt by incorporating crossholdings. We derive payoff functions of corporate securities when cross-holdings exist in corporations. By using the contraction method, the model allows us to value firms within a group characterized by complex multiple cross-holdings of stock.
A number of important insight about cross-holdings emerge from the payoff functions which we derive. We found the following two main results:
(i) The Modjgliani-Miller theorem can obtain when there exist cross-holdings of stock. Thus a firm's business asset value is invariant to the establishment of cross-holdings. In this analysis) we assume a complete market and firms that maintain identical businesses as in Merton [14] ) [15] .
(ii) By establishing cross-shareholdings stock holders distributes a part of its payoff values to the bond holders of each other's firm, so that both firms can decrease credit risks by cross-shareholdings. We should note that when two highly correlated firms establish crossshareholdings, credit reductions are not appeared significantly.
Our model allows the following applications: (a) the practical reevaluation of cross-held stocks to determine which are beneficial or disadvantageous for companies with complex ' multiple cross-holdings) and (b) a value at risk (VaR) approach for business asset exposure and investment exposure involving complex multiple cross-holdings. These applications are made possible by the fact that our model allows for multi dimensional business assets and multi dimensional firms with complex multiple cross-holdings.
We denote Rb,ml = {(xl, . . . , xn)' : X I , . . . , xn E [O, co)) by n-dimensional non-negative real number space. Let (Rb,ml, d) be a metric space where Then, the function g can be a map from RiNm) to R; :) where and where Z is defined by equation (4) . 
